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    <journal-meta>
      <journal-id journal-id-type="nlm-ta">Rea Press</journal-id>
      <journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">null</journal-id>
      <journal-title>Rea Press</journal-title><issn pub-type="ppub">3009-4461</issn><issn pub-type="epub">3009-4461</issn><publisher>
      	<publisher-name>Rea Press</publisher-name>
      </publisher>
    </journal-meta>
    <article-meta>
      <article-id pub-id-type="doi">https://doi.org/10.22105/tqfb.v1i2.43</article-id>
      <article-categories>
        <subj-group subj-group-type="heading">
          <subject>Research Article</subject>
        </subj-group>
        <subj-group><subject> Agency costs, Tax planning, Government ownership</subject></subj-group>
      </article-categories>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Agency Costs, Tax Planning with Emphasis on the Moderating Role of Government Ownership</article-title><subtitle>Agency Costs, Tax Planning with Emphasis on the Moderating Role of Government Ownership</subtitle></title-group>
      <contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author">
	<name name-style="western">
	<surname>Shemshad</surname>
		<given-names>Azadeh</given-names>
	</name>
	<aff>Department of Accounting and Control, Erasmus University, Rotterdam, Netherlands.</aff>
	</contrib></contrib-group>		
      <pub-date pub-type="ppub">
        <month>05</month>
        <year>2024</year>
      </pub-date>
      <pub-date pub-type="epub">
        <day>01</day>
        <month>05</month>
        <year>2024</year>
      </pub-date>
      <volume>1</volume>
      <issue>2</issue>
      <permissions>
        <copyright-statement>© 2024 Rea Press</copyright-statement>
        <copyright-year>2024</copyright-year>
        <license license-type="open-access" xlink:href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/"><p>This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.</p></license>
      </permissions>
      <related-article related-article-type="companion" vol="2" page="e235" id="RA1" ext-link-type="pmc">
			<article-title>Agency Costs, Tax Planning with Emphasis on the Moderating Role of Government Ownership</article-title>
      </related-article>
	  <abstract abstract-type="toc">
		<p>
			This research aims to study agency costs and tax planning, emphasizing the moderating role of government ownership. Taxation, as the primary means of raising revenue, can help governments achieve their macroeconomic objectives. Paying taxes is one of the most important tasks citizens can perform to provide financial resources for social welfare. In addition, politically connected companies have an opaque operating environment due to government support, resulting in more significant conflicts of interest and higher agency costs. To achieve this purpose, two hypotheses were formulated. To test these hypotheses, a sample of 142 companies was selected from the companies listed in the Tehran Stock Exchange during 2014-2023. A multivariate regression model was applied using the panel data method. The results of the research hypotheses indicate that agency costs and tax planning have a positive and significant relationship. The results also suggest that government ownership does not affect the relationship between agency costs and tax planning.
		</p>
		</abstract>
    </article-meta>
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